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THE MODERNIZATION OF LEGAL LISTS
WILLrAM R. WHITE* AND IRVINc A. J. LAwRxst
In modernizing our lists of legal investments the one paramount problem is to
provide investment standards which are broad enough to permit of the profitable
and safe investment of the vast amount of funds which are held by trustees and
savings institutions. The problem is not a new one. As early as x858, the Superin-
tendent of Banks in New York State in submitting his annual report to the legisla-
ture called attention to the fact that savings banks were experiencing difficulty in
investing their funds because of the few eligible securities.' The legislature from
time to time attempted to relieve the situation by expanding the investment authority
of individual institutions to include certain classes of public securities. Continued
pressure for broader investment powers eventually led in New York and in other
states to the admission of railroad bonds and, finally, of the obligations of public
utilities. But while lists were being gradually expanded, the amount of trust funds
and savings bank deposits were ever mounting, so that the need for a sound but
comprehensive list has never been fully satisfied.
In recent years the problem has been complicated by a severe business depression
and by factors which, in many instances, are traceable to the policies of the federal
government, the states or their municipalities. The plight of the railroads has become
a matter of common knowledge. The solution of their problems requires not only
an improvement in business, but also a plan of cooperation with the government
looking toward the elimination of duplicating facilities and the adoption of more
efficient policies of operation. The lack of sound financial practices on the part of
many political subdivisions has resulted in defaults and refunding operations, while
public utilities are faced in some cases, either by actual government competition, or
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1 "That $6,772,175, including interest on undrawn deposits, should seek investment in this class of
institutions during the past year, and that the payments to depositors should have reached the amount of
$21,789,493, while their deposits during the same period were $26,514,144, is a result well calculated to
attract the attention of the philanthropist as well as the legislator, as he contemplates the apparent increase
from year to year, of this immense trust fund.
"Already complaints reach this department of the inconvenience and difficulty of invcstinj this great
fund; and applications are made to the Legislature to admit the introduction of other securities than those
allowed by the respective charters under which the various trustees are acting." REPORT ov THE [N. Y.
STATE) SUPERINTEmENT OF BANKS RELATivE TO SAVINGS BANKS, 1858, p. 2.
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by the threat of such competition. The mortgage field, which has long been the prin-
cipal source of income for trustees and savings banks, has been seriously affected.
Unemployment has resulted in a dearth of new mortgages, in a multitude of fore-
closures, and in a high percentage of arrears in taxes and interest upon existing liens.
As a consequence of these developments, a tremendous volume of funds has been
invested in government obligations. 2 Even in this field, however, the investor must
weigh the factors of a low yield, a mounting government deficit and the possibility
of depreciation resulting from an increase in money rates.
While many trustees are disturbed by the situation confronting them, it is argued
by some that during a period of social and economic readjustment it is futile to at-
tempt a general revision of our investment standards. This opinion prevailed quite
generally in 1932 and 1933, but as time has passed we have found that depressed
business conditions have brought to the fore numerous investment problems of a
fundamental nature. It is to these problems which are likely to be obscured in times
of prosperity that we should now direct our attention.
Briefly stated, it was the early rule of the common law that a trustee was required
to exercise sound discretion in making investments.&3 The application of this stand-
ard resulted in certain jurisdictions in what is known as the Massachusetts rule.
The essence of this rule is that the courts do not attempt to prescribe with exactitude
the securities in which a trustee may invest. On the contrary, the trustee is permitted
a wide range of latitude in which to exercise his discretion, provided he acts with
prudence and in good faith.4
CHANGING STATE POLICIES
In New York the common law evolved a much narrower rule than in Massachu-
setts, with the result that in the Empire State investments were confined to govern-
' "The world's outstanding example of safety-seeking capital comes from India, where princes preserve
their wealth in the indestructible form of gold and jewels--and the Indian masses starve. Safety, one
need scarcely be reminded, is not characteristic of any new or rapidly expanding enterprise. On the
contrary, safety is the characteristic of the relatively least productive securities, of the so-called 'legal
investments,' of liens on fixed property whose value is already established and proved, and of the govern-
ment bonds. In investments and enterprises such as these capital is content with a return of from one
to four per cent; and the more capital falls back on this kind of return, the slower must be the expansion
of the economy." FORTIJNE, May, 1938, p. 58.
At common law in England it was for many years the rule that trust funds could be invested in
government securities only. Investments in stock of corporations were not allowed unless expressly
authorized by the instrument creating the trust. See (i92i) 69 UNiv. oF PA. L. REv. 189. Bogert states
that fiduciary investments in England were limited by court order to government or bank annuities. He
further says that doubt as to the soundness of real property securities was solved by the passage of a
statute validating such investment in realty within the United Kingdom and later English legislation has
greatly widened the field of trust investments. See 3 BoGERT, TRusTS AND TRusTEs, (1935) §163, with
notes citing the English statutes. The University of Pennsylvania Law Review note cited says that the
common law rule in England was followed so strictly that Parliament finally interposed and by statutes
passed during the reign of Queen Victoria it authorized the investment of trust funds in the stock
of the Bank of England or of Ireland or in mortgages upon freehold or copyhold estates. Subsequent
legislation in England has continually enlarged the scope of the legal list and finally the English Trustees
Act of 1925 (set out in Bogert) was enacted which contains an unusually broad legal list wherein
fiduciaries may invest.
'GRANGE, STAUB ANtD BLACKFOaD, WILLS, ExECtUITORS AND TRusrras (1933) 337.
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ment bonds and first mortgages on improved real property. Before many years had
passed, however, the legal list as so established was found to be inadequate to meet
the needs of an ever increasing accumulation of trust funds. In 1897 an act was
adopted permitting investments -to be made in the obligations of cities located in
New York 5 and in 19o2 the more important step was taken of permitting trustees to
purchase any of the securities authorized as investment for savings banks.0 While
this amendment to the statute added certain classes of railroad bonds and public
securities to the list eligible for purchase by trustees, it was by no means a solution
of the problem, since the savings banks list itself was already subject to pressure due
to mounting deposits in savings institutions.7
It is interesting to observe that, while New York was compelled to abandon the
rule of her common law, shd was unwilling to go the whole distance and adopt the
principle laid down in Massachusetts. Instead, she chose the convenient course of
extending the investment authority of trustees to a list of securities already in
existence. This was done without regard to the fact that the savings banks list had
originated to serve the needs of a group of institutions which were founded as
mutual benefit associations and which were operated in most cases, not by full-time
paid executives, but by laymen who found it possible to donate a portion of their time
to this public service.8 Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that manage-
ment was strictly limited in the selection of investments. While the list was later
expanded from time to time, the principle of limitation which characterized its origin
was never abandoned.
So long as trust functions were performed mainly by individuals, usually laymen,
there was some reason for maintaining consistency in the investment powers of
6 N. Y. Laws 1897, C. 417. "N. Y. Laws 1902, C. 295.
"'In the six years covering my incumbency of the office of Superintendent of Banks, constituting a
natural periQd for comparison, the savings banks have gained $348,486,043.37 in resources, or a larger
amount than in the previous fourteen years, and the trust companies $576,773,865.75, which is nearly one
and a half times their entire combined accumulations for all the years prior to 1896. That these stupen-
dous increases have not been made at the expense of other banking corporations is evidenced by the fact
that the National and State discount banks in the State have increased their resources in the same time by
about eight hundred million dollars. The present total assets of these three classes of institutions approx-
imate four thousand millions of dollars, over forty per cent of which has been accumulated in six years....
"New York's system of savings banks is the best in the world, and it should be our pride and care to
so maintain it. But with deposits increasing at the rate of sixty or seventy million dollars a year, if the
field for investment were held unchanged, there would follow of necessity an appreciation in the price of
such securities until in time it became prohibitive ... " REPORT OF TIlE [N. Y. STATE] SUPERINTENDENT
OF BANKS, RELATIVE TO SAVINGS BANKS, Thusr COMPANIES, SAFE DEPOSIT COMPANIES, AND MISCELLANEOUS
CORPORATIONS, 1901, pp. 5, 31.
8
'First. Savings banks being in a measure charitable institutions, they lose their distinctive character
in this respect if those who conduct and manage them have any other than perfectly disinterested relations
to their trust.
"Second. If a trustee may be at the same time an officer, enjoying a comfortable salary, the purity of
motive implied in the acceptance of an unpaid position of care and responsibility, which should be above
possible question, is at once sullied with doubts and suspicions of selfish and interested designs." Emerson
W. Keyes, Deputy Superintendent of Banks, N. Y. State, Spedal Report on Savings Banks (1868) 138.
However, Chapter 136 of the Laws of 858 authorized the payment of a salary to the president of any
savings bank in New York, Brooklyn and Buffalo, but provided that "no person shall be elected or remain
such president whose professional or other engagements shall prevent his regular and faithful attendance
to the duties of his office."
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savings banks and fiduciaries. In i9o2, however, when this principle of consistency
was reaffirmed by the legislature, a factor was present which might well have dic-
tated a somewhat different course than that which was adopted, for by this time
corporate fiduciaries had come to occupy an important position in the financial
world. Unlike savings banks, trust companies were organized for private profit.
They were managed by paid executives and many of them retained the services of
investment experts. These facts, however, apparently never appealed to the legislature
as justifying an expansion of the discretionary powers of corporate trustees. On the
contrary, this class of fiduciaries has been confined to the list which was designed
and maintained primarily to serve the needs of institutions for savings. Whenever
investment standards have been changed, the views of savings banks, as expressed
through their association, have been accorded great weight by the legislature. On the
other hand, trustees, because of their reluctance to trespass in a field where the rights
of savings banks have become firmly established, have exerted little or no influence
in the development of the list. In recent years the Trust Companies Association has
expressed dissatisfaction with the present system and has considered the advisability
of applying to the legislature for a separate list. Provision for such a list would no
doubt encourage the great corporate trustees in New York to take a more active
interest in the many public problems involved in maintaining modern investment
standards.
As a result of cooperation between the legislature and the Bankers Association,
Pennsylvania, in x935, adopted a new statute which substantially broadened the list
of eligible securities.9 Originally the Keystone State followed the narrow common
law view which confined trust investments to government bonds and first mort-
gages on real estate. Like New York, however, she soon found this rule to be un-
workable and was obliged to effect modification through legislation. In 1824 a
statute was passed authorizing the Orphans Court on petition to direct investment in
the debt of the United States, of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, of the City of
Philadelphia, or in real securities. The list as so established was periodically expanded
from about i85o until it included the obligations of certain other municipalities
within the State of Pennsylvania and also of the Pennsylvania and Reading railroads
and of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company. Presumably this type of legisla-
tion led to general dissatisfaction, for, when the Constitution of 1873 was adopted, it
prohibited the General Assembly from authorizing investment in bonds and stock of
any private corporation. Thereafter, legislation permitted investments in various
governmental obligations. As a rule, the state courts attempted to interpret the
constitutional restriction of 1873 broadly. This was apparently founded on the fact
that courts sympathized with the fiduciary who was faced with the problem of in-
vesting increasing volumes of trust funds within the limits of a narrow list. In 1929
requests were made to the legislature by the Pennsylvania Bankers Association for a
relaxation of the constitutional provision. An amendment was voted at the polls in
0 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1935) §8ox.
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1933, which repealed the constitutional limitation of 1873 and provided that the
General Assembly might from time to time prescribe investments for fiduciaries.
Pursuant to this amendment, an act was passed authorizing fiduciaries to invest in a
fairly broad list of securities. Pennsylvania thus provided separate lists for savings
banks and trustees. While there is no substantial difference in the scope of the two
lists, it appears that the Commonwealth has taken a progressive step in recognizing
the investment problems of trustees as sufficiently important to command the atten-
tion of the legislature. Moreover, since the act referred to was adopted largely upon
the recommendation of the Bankers Association, it may fairly be assumed that in the
future the views of corporate trustees will be considered whenever amendments are
under discussion.
The need for cooperative action between the state and mutual savings institutions
with respect to investments has recently been recognized in two jurisdictions. An act
adopted by the Maine Legislature in 1937 authorizes the Bank Commissioner, ulon
the written recommendation of a special committee of the Savings Banks Association,
to expand the list to include certain railroad securities which he deems suitable for
investment by savings banks.10 An amendment passed this year in New York em-
powers the State Banking Board, upon the application of not less than twenty savings
banks or of a trust company all the stock of which is owned by savings banks, to add
to the regular list corporate interest-bearing obligations not otherwise eligible for
investment.1 While the lists in both these states are intended primarily for the use
of savings institutions, the principle might readily be extended to permit trustees to
make recommendations relative to the lists from which they are required to select
investments.
The statutes enacted in Maine and New York are also deserving of consideration
because they provide for a degree of flexibility which is lacking in states where
specific investment standards are fixed by legislation. Principally to achieve such
flexibility, New Hampshire has gone even further than Maine or New York by pro-
viding for a Board of Investment which has authority, acting in conjunction with the
Banking Commissioner, to prescribe within certain general limits the securities in
which savings banks may invest.
in each of the three states mentioned, the principle of permitting a state official or
board to exercise discretion in compiling the legal list was .adopted because of the
difficulty encountered in attempting to prescribe fixed statutory standards which
operate efficiently, to provide a sound list of securities. To devise statutory tests
which admit a high percentage of all sound securities without also qualifying a sub-
stantial volume of questionable obligations has been found to be a difficult, if not
impossible, task. A study being conducted for the Brookings Institution by Professor
George W. Edwards, of the College of the City of New York, illustrates the in-
'
0 ME. REv. STAT. (930) C. 57, §27, as amended by Me. Laws 1931, 1933, 1935 and x937.
' N. Y. Laws 1938, c. 684.
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effectiveness of the present tests applicable to railroad securities and emphasizes the
difficulty of devising acceptable statutory standards.12
RAIuoAD STAmARDs ARE INEFFEcTrvE
Professor Edwards divided the railroads into two classes, good and poor. With
the good roads he included all those whose bonds at no time during the depression
showed a yield above 6%, while the poor road group was restricted to those whose
securities either had a yield above io% or which went into default. Professor Ed-
wards then subjected these roads to various tests. As the requirements of the various
states are not consistent, Professor Edwards, for the purpose of his study, selected the
most stringent test of each type employed by any state. The data given cover the
years 1923 to 1934 inclusive. Without attempting here to evaluate the basis of divid-
ing the roads into good and poor, it is interesting to observe the effectiveness of each
test in excluding the securities of the poor roads from the legal list and at the same
time admitting to the list the obligations of the good roads.
One of the tests found in many statutes relates to minimum single track mileage
of 500 miles. During the twelve-year period studied, this test excluded 20% of the
good roads and admitted 33% of the poor ones, with practically no annual variation
from these figures. Another test requires a minimum gross operating revenue of
$io,ooo,ooo or $i5,ooooo. On the basis of the latter figure, 73% of the good roads
qualified up until 193o, and about 6o% after I93O. More than half the poor roads,
however, met this requirement until 1929 and during the depth of the depression the
figure never fell below z2%.
The requirement that a road pay 4% dividends on its capital stock was more
satisfactory. It admitted to legal status 870/. to 94% of the good roads prior to i93i,
but these figures fell off sharply to 27/0 in 1933. About a third of the poor roads
met the dividend test from 1926 to 1929, 41% in 193o, i / in 193i, and o% in the
three subsequent years.
The test prescribing that cash dividends must be equal to at least one-third of
fixed charges qualified a high percentage of good roads, about 87 / in prosperous
years and approximately 6o% during 1932 and '33. During 1928, '29 and '3o, 4%
of the poor roads were also eligible under this requirement, but only 4% qualified
during 1932, '33 and '34. The 1.5 ratio of earnings to fixed charges admitted nearly
all the good roads immediately prior to 193i, but in 1925 it also qualified 78% of the
poor roads. In 1932 the percentage of good roads eligible under this test dropped to
53% and that of the poor roads to 3%.
The requirement that gross earnings be 5.0 times fixed charges admitted nearly
all the roads, good and poor, during the prosperous years. During the depression a
large percentage of the good roads and about one-third of the poor ones continued
to meet the test. Another requirement, that total debt shall not exceed 3.0 times
1 For a presentation of the results of this study, see Edwards, New Standards for Railroad Securities
(1937) Thurr CompAl4Ts 174.
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capital stock, qualified most of the good and poor roads in time of both prosperity
and depression.
This study made by Professor Edwards, with the assistance of a staff of WPA
workers, was for the purpose of ascertaining if more satisfactory statutory tests could
be devised. Commenting on the results of his attempt to find new and more effective
tests, he said,"3
"Most of these tests proved to be as ineffective as the legal requirements when judged
by actual investment experience .... Most startling of all was the apparent uselessness
of all the ratios measuring the burden of debt and the nature of the capital structure of a
railroad such as the debt per mile, ratio of property to debt, and the ratio of debt to total
capitalization...."
Professor Edwards, however, found several tests, based largely upon income,
which he believes are somewhat more effective than present standards. Apparently
the most satisfactory of these is a minimum freight density requirement of x,2oo,ooo
ton miles. The author points out, however, that, even on this basis, one-third of
the poor roads would have qualified in 1929, and x3%-2o of the good roads would
not have qualified during pre-depression years. According to some of the other pro-
posed tests, from 2o to more than 5oo of the poor roads would have qualified
prior to i93o.
Professor Edwards' study provides excellent evidence of the difficulty of devising
satisfactory statutory tests even with respect to the basic facts which can readily be
ascertained in the case of all railroads. Obviously, it is even more difficult to apply
rigid tests to other factors of a more intangible nature. For example, it seems im-
possible to provide standards giving effect to probable future developments involving
changing tastes, shifts of population, and new means of transportation. Neverthe-
less, it is factors such as these which must be considered if a security is to be admitted
to the legal list before it is selling at a high premium or dropped before it has greatly
depreciated in value.14
'ld. at 375.
"'One of the principal criticisms levied against the legal list is that it is an incentive to buying at the
"top" and selling at the "bottom.;'
"Let us suppose that a trustee in z921 invested the corpus of a new trust in 'legals' at an average price
of 95. The entire list appreciates to an average of zo5. The trustee may shift the investment, take his
profits and look for re-investment opportunities. He will hardly find them within the legal list, for all
bonds are likely to be up. Possibly he turns to mortgages. But he is under no compulsion to do any-
thing. On the other hand, let the bond list decline, let the earnings of the obligors fall below the legal
standard and the security forthwith becomes non-egal. The trustee may retain it, but it is his own
responsibility if he does. By the time this question arises the bonds will have depreciated considerably in
price. And here is a fundamental flaw in the statutory prescription of investment standards. An incentve
is given fdr selling out at a low price but no incentive is given for selling out at a high price. Now as a
matter of investment management any rule or 'condition which provides an incentive to dispose of first
lien bonds at a time of the obligor's adversity and no corresponding incentive to dispose of them at the
height of its prosperity is fundamentally unsound. It is conducive to buying at the top aAd selling at the
bottom. An investment manager tries to do exactly the opposite." Woodruff, Legal and Investment
Standards of Trustees (1935) 4 Fos-- L. Exv. 42.
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MUNICIPAL TEsTs ALso FAIL
In the field of municipal securities, it is also difficult to devise effective statutory
tests.' 5 A large percentage of the states authorize trustees or savings banks to invest
in the obligations of their own political subdivisions without restriction or limitation.
Standards imposed usually deal with the municipalities of other states and relate
principally to population, taxing power and amount and character of debt burden.
There seems to be no generally accepted rule relative to the minimum population
which a city or village must have before its obligations may qualify as legal invest-
ments. For example, New York imposes no population test with respect to its own
municipalities, but requires a city in a state adjoining New York to have at least
Ioooo inhabitants, and provides that cities located in other states shall have a popula-
tion of at least 30,000. It seems impossible to reconcile these three different rules, or to
suggest any other minimum population requirement which would serve as an
effective and accurate standard. While a considerable number of small communities
have experienced financial difficulties since i93o, it is also a fact that a substantial
number of small municipalities in good financial standing have been unable to
qualify their obligations because of their inability to meet minimum population
standards. The number of inhabitants should unquestionably be taken into account
in appraising the credit standing of a municipality, but this factor should be con-
sidered in connection with others and not as an independent qualification to be
determined by a rigid statutory requirement. Much more important than the num-
ber of inhabitants are the type and trend of population, factors which cannot be
reduced to simple, inflexible formulae.
The authority of a community to levy taxes should undoubtedly be considered in
setting up investment standards. Some states require that a municipality in order to
qualify its obligations as legal investments shall have unlimited power to tax real
property for the payment of such obligations. Such provisions have recently attracted
considerable attention in view of the fact that certain states have within the past
few years imposed tax limitations, while in other states proposed limitations are
being discussed. Hence the rule requiring unlimited taxing power tends to bar an
' Professor EdWards is now making a study of municipals and utilities, which will be completed next
year. For the purpose of this article, he has kindly allowed us to quote him as follows:
"In general, our study shows that the legal tests for utility bonds bad a much better investment ex-
perience than those for railroad bonds. However, the fundamental defect in the legal tests for utility
bonds is their failure to recognize financial differences in the various classes of utilities. It is impossible to
set up one set of standards for all classes of utility bonds, and so our recommendations will include dif-
ferent tests for the different classes of this group.
"Our study further shows that the legal tests for municipal bonds are very incomplete. In general
these tests were based on the theory that public credit could be accepted without question, and that there
was no need of careful study of municipal obligations. The unfavorable trend of municipal credit in
recent years and the unhappy investment experience of thousands of municipal bonds have demonstrated
the need of applying specific tests to this class of bonds. Fortunately, this group lends itself to exact
measurement and quantitative tests even better than corporate bonds, and we have been able to establish
some tests which should prove useful. We have made a tentative exploration in the field of industrial
bonds, but as yet have arrived at no definite conclusions. Our preliminary study shows that the field is
promising and offers justification of industrial bonds in the legal list. The lack of standardization of
accounting in this field makes difficult the task of formulating exact tests."
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increasing volume of municipal securities. In the main, this test is sound because we
appear to be going through a period in which the number of services rendered the
public is being constantly increased. A rigid tax limitation, therefore, may at some
future time prevent a municipality from levying the necessary taxes to meet an ex-
panded budget. Unlimited taxing power, however, is no guarantee of sound mu-
nicipal credit. There is little satisfaction to be found in the fact that a community
has unlimited taxing power if deficits have been accumulated, due to a demonstrated
inability to collect the taxes levied.
The difficulty of determining by statutory standards when a community has be-
come over-extended in debt has been emphasized by recent, experience. The two
most important phases of this problem relate to (i) determining what obligations
should be included in computing municipal indebtedness and (2) the yardstick to
be used in deciding whether the indebtedness so calculated is unduly heavy.
It'would appear to be a relatively simple task to compute the total indebtedness
of a municipality. Nevertheless, the application of the formula laid down pursuant
to the New York statute has produced results which seem contrary to the elementary
principles of arithmetic, for it has been held that notes issued in anticipation of the
collection of delinquent taxes may be excluded from the computation of indebted-
ness. This legal ruling was based upon the theory that delinquent taxes are an asset
specially pledged to the payment of the notes and that consequently they place no
further general burden upon the community. Experience has proved this theory to
be uritenable in practice. A number of municipalities in one eastern state suffered
serious financial difficulty because of the large accumulation of debt of this character.
Had these items been included as "indebtedness" in determining the status of the
municipalities in question, their obligations would have become non-legal before
serious financial difficulty was encountered. Instead, these obligations remained on
the legal list until the credit of the issuing municipalities had become impaired, and
in at least one instance removal from the list followed adoption by the city of a
conservative plan providing for the funding of its floating debt and a pledge to main-
tain operations thereafter on a cash basis. This experience in the application of the
New York statute is worthy of note as illustrating that a municipality in financial
difficulty sometimes resorts to practices not contemplated by a legislature in prescrib-
ing investment standards. Had there been no statute upon this point justifying a
contrary view, sound investment principles would have dictated the inclusion as in-
debtedness of notes issued in anticipation of the collection of delinquent taxes.
A second phase of the problem of how indebtedness is to be computed relates to
obligations issued for the financing of municipal utilities. Present provisions usually
exclude water debt, which is justifiable to the extent that such debt is supported by
the earnings of the water department and is not dependent upon tax collections. It is
also reasonable that debt incurred for the construction of municipal lighting systems
should be excluded to the extent that such debt is self-supporting. This principle,
however, should not be extended to include all debt incurred in connection with
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municipal projects merely because provision is made for the collection of fees or
charges other than taxes for the services rendered. The number of municipal under-
takings which have proved financial failures indicates the wisdom of a strict rule in
permitting exemptions of debt incurred for specific purposes. Generally speaking,
this principle is one which can be effectively prescribed by statute. The difficulty is
that any debt exemptions permitted by the statute are apt to be applied with equal
force to all municipalities without regard to the varying degrees of success enjoyed
by the utilities whose debts are exempted.
But even assuming that effective provisions of law can be written prescribing
satisfactory methods for computing indebtedness, we are still faced with the problem
of determining when in the case of any municipality such indebtedness is reasonable.
Assessed valuation of real estate is the basis usually employed for determining the
amount of debt which a city can safely support. The difficulty with this test is that it
leaves no discretion to the authority compiling the legal list to take into consideration
variance in practice in the evaluation of real estate for tax purposes. Cases which
have come to light, illustrating that assessed valuation is not always a reliable index,
have caused consideration to be given to the enactment of a standard relating total
debt to population. A uniform per capita debt limit, however, would probably not
be acceptable, because it is generally conceded that large cities can support a greater
per capita indebtedness than villages or small cities. In any event, both of these
standards are open to the criticism that they fail to take into account many factors
which bear directly upon the question of how great a debt a particular community is
able to support. It can, in fact, be said of all provisions prescribing the standards
applicable to municipal obligations, that they fail to permit an exercise of discretion
with respect to such important factors as transportation facilities, diversification of
industry, community wealth, and the character of municipal management. If factors
such as these could be taken into consideration in addition to the tests prescribed
by the statute, the obligations of communities apparently headed for financial diffi-
culty might be removed from the list before they suffered serious market depreciation,
and the bonds of other municipalities might safely be added to the list, even though
the issuing body failed to meet one of the technical statutory standards.
AN INVr SENT BOA"D AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING FLExIBILITY
We might go on to discuss sections of law dealing with other classes of securities,
but such an examination would only serve to emphasize the weakness which we have
found in the tests dealing with railroads and municipalities. It is true that some of
these defects are of a technical nature and could no doubt be cured by a careful
revision of existing statutes. The basic weakness, however, that of inflexibility, can
apparently be corrected only by a fundamental change which would permit the
exercise of discretion in compiling legal lists. Perhaps the solution lies in abandon-
ing statutory tests and adopting the Massachusetts rule, which permits wide discre-
tion to the trustee but holds him to reasonable standards of diligence and, prudence
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in the selection of investments. It is doubtful, however, that states such as New
York, where the concept of the legal list is deeply rooted in law and practice, would
be willing to make a decisive change in a matter of such great importance. The
alternative which has been suggested is the plan which is being tried in those states
where a public official or board is vested with broad discretion and responsibility to
select suitable securities for savings bank or trust investment.10
The principal arguments advanced for this method of providing a legal list may
be summarized as follows:
i. Assuming the appointing officer acts intelligently and in good faith, the person
or persons selected to compile the legal list will be fitted by experience to assume
such a responsibility. A legislature, unless it happens to have investment experts
among its membership who are willing to keep in constant touch with the problem
of legal investments, must rely almost completely upon the recommendations of
independent groups or individuals.
2. A board is able to act with reasonable promptness in effecting changes in the
list, whereas the legislative process is generally slow, due in part to the fact that some
forty of our state legislatures do not meet more frequently than biennially.
3. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe fixed tests which will work with a
high degree of accuracy. General standards, if sufficiently strict to exclude unsound
securities, often disqualify otherwise desirable investments because the issuing body
fails to meet one of the prescribed tests. Conversely, some securities which are unde-
sirable from the standpoint of a sound investment policy manage to qualify because
they meet the technical minimum standards. It is argued that this difficulty is
avoided by entrusting the compilation of the list to a board which can consider each
issue of securities upon its merits.
4- A board can consider all of the factors affecting the desirability of a particular
security. Statutory tests are based upon the past record of the issuing municipality
or corporation, but they take no cognizance of future probabilities suggested by
economic trends.
The two principal arguments which are most frequently advanced in opposition
to the idea of permitting the exercise of discretion to a public official or board in
compiling a legal list are as follows:
i. It is contended that positions on any such board would, in most cases, be
filled by politicians not qualified to judge securities but susceptible to influence
exerted by special interests.
" "A bill authorizing savings banks to invest in bonds of any corporation or individual secured'by first
mortgage upon property in this State, and 'in other good securities (excepting bills of exchange, promissory
notes, deposits of personal property and stocks, to which by law the personal liability of stockholders at.
taches), which might be approved by the Superintendent of the Banking Department, the Governor,
Comptroller and State Treasurer, or a majority of them,' passed the Legislature of 1883, with little or no
opposition. Upon calling the attention of the several savings banks to the fact that this bill needed but
the signature of the Governor to become a law, I was enabled to present the earnest protest of repre-
sentatives of savings banks holding $449,000,000 of the total $459,ooo,ooo of resources in the banks at
that time, which resulted in the executive veto." REP RT OF THE [N. Y. STATE] SUPERINTENDENT OF
BANKs RELATIvE TO SAvIOs BANxs, 1885, p. 25 (italics ours).
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2. It is argued that a security mentioned on a list compiled by a board acting with
discretion it apt to be regarded as bearing the stamp of approval of the state and
therefore as not requiring examination by the investor.
These two criticisms are undoubtedly worthy of consideration but neither presents
an insuperable difficulty. To insure against the possibility of having unqualified per-
sons appointed, provision might be made authorizing corporate trustees to select
candidates from whom the Governor would be required to appoint the members of
the investment board. To avoid further the possibility of the positions being utilized
for patronage purposes, the members could be prohibited from receiving any re-
muneration other than expenses actually incurred in connection with their duties.17
Such a plan should provide, however, for a staff of adequately compensated experts
having the protection of civil service. This staff would compile data and prepare
recommendations for consideration at the periodic meetings of the investment board.
As a safeguard against the activities of pressure groups, the statute might provide
that the board could list securities only upon application of a specified number of
corporate fiduciaries. In any event, the statute should sanction the submission to
the board of recommendations by corporate trustees.
The second criticism of the principle of authorizing a board to select a legal list
involves the question of whether such a plan can be set up in a manner to avoid
assumption by the state of responsibility which properly belongs to the trustee. It
has been argued with some justification that the existence of legal lists has sometimes
encouraged savings bank management to select investments from those enumerated,
without thoughtful investigation. Such practices, however, have no doubt been en-
couraged in some cases by statutes which tend to minimize the responsibility of man-
agement in selecting investments.' 8 Moreover, the savings bank trustee, although
his activities are supervised by the state, is not directly responsible to the beneficiary
in the same manner as the ordinary fiduciary, who must always be prepared to
appear in court and justify his actions in the light of statutes and court decisions.
It therefore rests with legislatures and with courts to adhere to a policy which
places proper responsibility upon the trustee to select investments with due regard
not only to quality but also to diversification and maturities, factors which must be
'1"7. No compensation should be paid to members of, the [State banking] board for their- services, but
adequate provision should be made to cover the expenses they may incur while rendering such service.
"Comment: Since compensation suffcient to attract the type of man desired as a member of such a
board cannot be paid, and since the offer of a stated sum might have the undesirable effect of attracting
political job-seekers, it would seem that to provide compensation would be to defeat the purposes for
which a banking board is created." BANKXNo Bo.waxs, STATUTORY AND FAcTuAL STusY (Research Council,
Am. Bankers Ass'n, N. Y., 1938) 8.
' "S52. Superintendent must furnish savings banks list of legal investments....
"The trustees of a savings bank shall not be held liable for investing in state or municipal bonds
named in the last list furnished by the superintendent of banks pursuant to this section or in any obliga-
tions described in subdivisions seven, twelve or thirteen of section two hundred and thirty-nine of this
chapter mentioned in such list, which have been legally issued and properly executed, unless such savings
bank shall have been notified by the superintendent of banks, that in his judgment, such bonds do not
conform or have ceased to conform to the provisions of section two hundred and thirty-nine of this
c6Jper.' Excerpt from N. Y. BANKING LAw, S52.
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considered in the light of the needs of each particular trust.19 Such a policy is
fundamental, no matter what method a state may use in preparing its legal list.
SuMMAY
Our basic problem in modernizing legal investment standards, today as in the
past, is to provide a list which is broad enough to permit of judicious investment of
the vast amount of funds which are held in a fiduciary capacity. The difficulty in
achieving this objective has been emphasized by the economic and political develop-
ments of recent years. In reviewing the laws of different states we find numerous
conflicting standards due, usually, to historical influence, rather than to well-defined
policies designed to meet existing needs. A number of states which have statutory
investment standards provide a list primarily for the use of savings banks but, as a
matter of convenience, make the list also serve the purposes of trustees. Such a
policy is unsound, not only because it fails to recognize that factors exist justifying
different lists but also because it discourages corporate trustees from assuming re-
sponsibility for assisting in the maintenance of modern standards. Examination of
generally accepted tests governing two important classes of securities, railroads and
municipals, demonstrates the fundamental difficulty of attempting to prescribe fixed
statutory standards which operate effectively to maintain a broad list which is rea-
sonably free of inferior securities. Some states, desiring to maintain the principle of
the statutory list but wishing to overcome the defect of inflexibility, have authorized
a public official or board to exercise discretion in making additions to the legal list.
This plan of qualifying investments has not been adequately tested by experience,
nor is it free of criticism even in the states where it is being tried. Nevertheless, it
suggests possibilities deserving of consideration, not as a plan to substitute the discre-
tion and responsibility of the state for that of the trustee, but as the means of provid-
ing a more satisfactory list from which the trustee may select investments, subject
always to the rule that he act with reasonable diligence, prudence, and in good faith.
"The trustee who invests in securities included in the statutory list is relieved by the West Virginia
statute of all responsibility for subsequent losses. But four acts [Alabama, Delaware, Illinois and Min-
nesota] expressly impose the normal requirement of due care upon trustees who select or retain listed
securities, and this result will probably be reached by construction in other states whose statutes are silent
upon the subject. The desirability of blanket protection is questionable, since it is likely to invite a
cursory study of investment conditions by the trustee. Although a duty of due care is required, he would
still seem sufficiently protected under the acts. The existence of a statutory list avoids the unguided
selection of a proper class of investments and reduces the problem to a reasonable choice within the
permitted class. Moreover, the fact that the class of investment selected had received legislative approval
would undoubtedly influence the court in determining that the trustee had exercised due care." Note
(1936) 49 HAtv. L. Rxv. 821, and cases there cited.
